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We explore the performance of a set of early warning indicators for a group of 
Latin American economies under the endogenous cycle perspective. For this 
group of countries, the paper confirms the results of work on industrialized 
countries that a combination of asset prices and credit provides valuable 
information of probable future financial crises. However, we go a step further in 
the analysis of emerging economies and find that a combination of capital flows 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The recent global crisis brought to the forefront the need to confront the 
existence of instances of financial instability and episodes of systemic risk. 
While some renowned economists insist that these events cannot be predicted 
and that the most sensible attitude on the part of economic authorities is to deal 
with their consequences [Greenspan (2010)], there is, on the other hand, a 
long-standing tradition that contends that it is both possible and advisable to set 
up a framework that enhances the ability of the authorities to predict the 
occurrence of such episodes [Borio and Drehmann (2009b)]. Such framework 
may very well consist of a battery of early warning indicators, stress tests and 
early warning systems, among other things.  
 
The state of the art in this sort of exercises is summarized by Borio and 
Drehmann (2009a), who underscore the importance of simple early warning 
indicators as the basis for such operational frameworks. From an endogenous 
cycle perspective, the authors also stress the importance of equity prices and 
credit variables as elements that can be reliably used as signaling the buildup of 
financial imbalances that could eventually lead to financial distress.  
 
Drawing from related works, the authors also advance a methodology for 
selecting the best early warning indicators among various alternatives. 
Unfortunately, most of these works focus on developed countries, for which 
there is a substantial amount of available data.  
 
The present work is an attempt to apply this methodology to a group of Latin 
American countries in order to verify the extent to which equity prices and credit 
are reliable early warning indicators of future situations of risk-taking and 
financial imbalances. At the same time, the paper studies how these indicators 
perform in emerging economies whose cycle, while retaining an endogenous 
nature, is affected by external variables, in particular the flows of capital from 
abroad. The results in both fronts are positive: equity prices and credit provide 
valuable information of the buildup of systemic or macroeconomic risk in 
emerging economies, but credit and capital flows perform better as leading 
indicators of this process in such economies. 
 
The remainder of the paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 presents 
some background for our work. Section 3 provides a motivation about the 
relationship between asset prices and financial instability. Section 4 presents 
the rationale underlying the early warning indicators. Section 5 presents the 
methodology used to construct the indicators and the results of their 
performance. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Background and Analytical Framework 
 
As already mentioned, a good deal of effort has been allocated to developing 
frameworks or strategies to identify the buildup of financial imbalances that 
could eventually lead to episodes of financial instability or distress. These 
efforts have drawn on the results of numerous research exercises that have 
identified recurrent patterns of key variables in economic cycles and previous to   3
banking or financial crises. To mention just a few of these works, Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2008), for example, find that “systemic banking crises are typically 
preceded by asset price bubbles, large capital inflows and credit booms, in rich 
and poor countries alike”. In IMF (2009) it is found that “credit, shares of 
investment in GDP, current account deficits, and asset prices, typically rise, 
providing useful leading indicators of asset price busts”. Finally, Claessens at al 
(2008) conclude that the “analysis of the interactions between macroeconomic 
and financial variables around various episodes of business and financial cycles 
suggests that these interactions play key roles in determining the severity and 
duration of recessions. In particular, recessions associated with credit crunches 
and house price busts appear to be deeper and last longer than other 
recessions do”. These works are particularly relevant for Latin America, where 
swings in asset prices, credit and investment have traditionally been closely 
related to banking crisis and frequently to recessions.  
 
The background for this analysis on leading indicators are López et al (2008) 
and Tenjo et al (2007), where the relationship between asset prices and 
economic activity is tested through evidence of the existence of a financial 
accelerator mechanism in Colombia. From this point of view, our analytical 
approach to the modeling of financial instability is closer to what is known in the 
literature as “endogenous financial cycles”. Under this tradition, financial 
distress is perceived as the result of the buildup in risk-taking over time, owing 
to feedback mechanisms both inside the financial system and between this 
system and the rest of the economy. In this kind of models, there exists a 
mutually reinforcing link between credit and asset prices that arises from the 
use of collateral valued at market prices [Kiyotaky and Moore (1997) and 
Bernanke et at (1999)].  
  
For the construction of leading indicators, our work relies on Borio and Lowe 
(2002) and Borio and Drehmann (2009a) (2009b).  There is a wide variety of 
approaches to construct this type of indicators that ranges from traditional 
balance sheet variables to system-wide multi-module measurement models. 
However, as pointed out by Borio and Drehmann (2009a), ex ante measures of 
financial instability perform rather poorly, and while potentially promising, macro 
stress tests may mislead policymakers with a false appearance of security. By 
contrast, simple leading indicators rooted in the “endogenous cycle” view of 
financial instability appear better suited to identify risks of financial distress.  
 
Along these lines, Borio and Lowe (2002) found that focusing on the behavior of 
asset prices and credit is a promising line of enquiry to develop simple and 
transparent leading indicators of banking system distress. More recently, Borio 
and Drehmann (2009a) conclude that the combination of “unusually strong” 
increases in credit and asset prices constitute a simple indicator to assess the 
buildup of risks of banking distress.  
 
In this paper we investigate the performance of a set of indicators as a tool for 
macroprudential analysis for a group of Latin American countries. As mentioned 
above, recent studies regarding early leading indicators have centered their 
attention in the behavior of two key variables of the endogenous cycle in 
industrialized economies: asset prices and credit. Nonetheless, it is an amply   4
studied fact that, especially since the financial liberalization of the early 1990s, 
foreign financial conditions have played an important role in the business cycle 
of emerging economies. In particular, it is now recognized that capital flows tend 
to be an ingredient of the endogenous cycles in these economies.  It is then 
important to explore the extent to which these flows may also play a role in the 
search for leading indicators of financial distress in emerging market 
economies.  
 
We conduct a preliminary investigation of the usefulness of credit, asset price, 
capital flows and investment as predictors of future imbalances in the financial 
system of these economies. We are interested in two aspects: first, determining 
the performance of various indicators using information available to the 
policymaker at the time that the policy decision is made. And second, verifying 
how this performance improves when we consider jointly asset prices, credit, 
investment and capital flows. 
 
The terminology used in our study closely follows Borio and Drehmann (2009a).  
Along these lines, a financial crisis is an event in which “substantial losses at 
financial institutions and/or the failure of these institutions cause, or threaten to 
cause, serious dislocations to the real economy”. Correspondingly, financial 
instability is defined as a set of conditions that is sufficient to result in the 
emergence of financial crises in response to normal-sized shocks. 
 
3. Asset prices and financial instability in Latin America: Stylized Facts 
 
The quantitative analysis in this paper is based on a data set for five Latin 
American economies (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) and with 
information for asset prices (equity and, in a few cases, housing prices), credit, 
investment, capital flows and private investment for the period 1980-2008. All 
series are deflated by consumer price indices to account for inflation (a detailed 
description of the data set is presented in Appendix A). 
 
The evolution of stock prices in the five countries can be divided into three sub-
periods (Figure 1):  
 
-  In the eighties, real equity prices showed no clear trend with some spikes 
in Brazil and Argentina. 
 
-  In the nineties, a synchronized boom and bust episode was evident for 
all the countries in the sample except Brazil, where the rising trend 
continued during the entire decade. 
 
-  During the two-thousands, there was a substantial increase in amplitude 
in asset price movements until 2006, and a reversal afterwards.   
However, equity prices remained high in all the countries. 
 
It is worth noting that, with time, the cycles appear to be growing in amplitude. 
 
 
   5
Figure No.1
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It can be observed (Figure 2) that housing prices are less volatile than equity 
prices, but that the two follow the same time pattern. However, movements in 
equity prices tend to lead in one to two years those of housing prices. In the 
current upswing, equity markets have been particularly strong. With the 
exception of Argentina, housing prices have remained more subdued.  
 
Movements in asset prices tend to go hand in hand with movements in credit 
and investment, (Figure 3), with asset prices preceding both credit and 
investment.  However, the volatility of asset (equity) prices is higher than the 
volatility of the other two variables. 
 
There is a positive association between equity prices and capital flows (Figure 
4). Both variables tend to move together, although with brief periods in which 
they diverge. In general, for almost all the countries in the sample, movements 
in capital flows are followed by movements in equity prices and credit. During 
the nineties the association between these three variables was remarkable and 
in almost all the countries the decade ended with a sudden stop in capital flows 
and a banking crisis
2. Moreover, significant falls in capital flows and busts in 
asset prices have been associated with subsequent banking crises and 
recessions. This was true for a number of countries in the eighties (Brazil, Peru 
and México) and again in the nineties (e.g. Colombia, Peru and Argentina) 
(Figure 4). 
 
                                                 
2 Our source to identify banking crises is Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) for the period 1980-1995 and the 
criteria suggested by Borio and Drehmann (2009b) for the period 1995-2008.   6
Figure No.2
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4. The endogenous cycle view: The Financial Accelerator 
 
The analysis of the role of asset prices and their interaction with the real 
economy builds on the idea that the economy is exposed to financial frictions 
and that this interaction can be amplified by a financial accelerator mechanism. 
According to this mechanism, an increase (decrease) in asset prices improves a 
firm´s (or household´s) net worth, lowering (raising) the external finance 
premium which, in turn, enhances (reduces) its capacity to borrow, invest and 
spent [Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999)]. 
   7
There is empirical evidence in support of the existence of this mechanism in 
both industrialized and developing countries. For advanced economies, some 
empirical investigations analyze the dynamics of asset prices, credit cycles and 
real activity. Worth mentioning are, for example, the works by Dib and 
Christensen (2006) and by Borio, Furfino and Lowe (2001). For developing 
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Figure No.4
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Cycles in emerging economies are influenced by movements in capital flows. 
These movements feed into the functioning of the accelerator and may 
contribute to the dynamics of asset prices, credit and investment. This, in turn, 
makes the countries more vulnerable to financial distress and to abrupt changes 
in the direction of those flows. Capital inflows appreciate asset prices and 
create booms in credit that subsequently reverse when there is a sudden 
outflow of capital. In this sense we can think of capital inflows as a trigger of the 
“endogenous cycle” process.    
 
At the empirical level, Mendoza and Terrones (2008) show that the frequency of 
credit booms in emerging markets is higher when preceded by periods of large 
capital inflows but not when preceded by domestic financial reforms or gains in 
total factor productivity. Industrialized countries exhibit the opposite pattern. In   9
addition, Herrera and Perry (2003) found evidence that capital flows are one of 
the key determinants of asset prices bubbles in Latin America. 
 
The exchange rate regime can exacerbate this mechanism. An illustration of 
this for the case of Korea can be seen in Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2007), 
and for the case of Colombia in López et al. (2008). In these papers the 
combination of a financial accelerator mechanism and the exchange rate 
regime explains the severity of the crises at the end of the nineties in these two 
countries. In the face of a negative risk premium shock that produces capital 
outflows, if the monetary authority tries to defend a fixed exchange rate it will 
have to increase the domestic interest rate to levels that and it will cause asset 
prices, net worth, investment, consumption and output to fall in great proportion.  
On the other hand, if the monetary policy follows a conventional Taylor rule and 
the exchange regime is flexible, when the negative shock occurs. The capital 
outflows cause exchange rate devaluation, and therefore inflation of imported 
goods. The monetary authority raises the domestic interest rate to fight inflation 








The exercise is based on a signal-extraction method which is one of the most 
common approaches for the estimation of early warning indicators (Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (1999)). However, our approach incorporates some features 
suggested by Borio and Lowe (2002), in particular: 
 
i.  We focus on cumulative processes rather than growth rates calculated 
over just one year. We identify a credit boom as a period in which the 
ratio of credit to GDP deviates from its trend by some specific 
percentage. Similarly, we define equity price, housing prices, capital 
flows and investment booms as periods in which real equity and housing 
prices, the ratio of capital flows to GDP and investment to GDP deviate 
from their trends by specific amounts. We refer to these deviations as 
“credit gap”, “equity prices gap” “housing prices gaps”, “capital flows gap” 
and “investment gap”, respectively. 
 
ii.  In determining whether a boom exists or not, we use only ex ante 
information. The individual indicators are all measured as deviations from 
one-sided Hodrick-Prescott trends (gaps), calculated recursively up to 
time t. In order to capture the gradual and cumulative buildup of 
imbalances, a high degree of smoothing is used (lambda=1600). 
 
iii.  We consider combinations of indicators. Rapid credit growth, by itself, 
may pose little threat to the stability of the financial system. However, the 
combination of events, in particular the simultaneous occurrence of rapid 
growth of credit and asset prices, capital flows or investment, may 
increase the probability of crises.   10
 
iv.  Because the sequence of events takes time, we also consider multiple 
horizons. Specifically, a signal that points to a crisis is judged to be 
correct if a crisis occurs any time within one, two and three years ahead. 
 
For each period t, a signal is calculated. The signal takes the value of 1 if 
indicators variables exceed critical thresholds, or 0 otherwise. Ideally, the vector 
of thresholds would be chosen so that the indicator variables would always 
exceed the critical thresholds ahead of crisis and never during non-crisis 
periods. However, choosing the optimal threshold involves a trade-off between 
the occurrence of type 1 errors (no signal is issued and crisis occurs) and type 2 
errors (a signal is issued but no crisis occurs). In general, lower thresholds 
predict higher percentage of crisis, but at the cost of predicting more crises that 
do not occur (false positives).  
 
To establish the dates of occurrence of banking crises we use the dates from 
Kaminsky and Reinhanrt (1999). For the period 1996-2008 we resort to one of 
the criteria suggested by Borio and Drehmann (2009b), which is that a country 
is in crisis when its government had to inject capital in more than one large bank 
and/or when more than one large bank failed. Given that gaps are calculated if 
at least 10 years of data are available before any prediction is made, this gave 





Taking into account only the individual indicators (Table No. 1), we can observe 
the following results:  
 
i.  Of the five indicators individually considered, the best is the capital flows 
gap: it has the lowest noise to signal ratio and one of the highest 
percentages of crises predicted. A threshold of around 4% produces the 
best results: nearly 60% of the crises are predicted at one-year horizon, 
while false positive signals are issued around 16% of the time.  
 
ii.  The second best single-variable indicator is the credit gap. A threshold 
between 3 and 5 produce the best results. With a threshold of 3 
percentage points, 60% of the crises are predicted at one-year horizon, 
while false positive signals are issued around 25% of the time.  
 
iii.  The asset price indicator provides relatively noisy signals at the one-year 
horizon. With a threshold of 30-40, 60% of the crises are predicted and 
false positive signals are issued 50% of the time. The performance of the 
indicator improves considerably when the time horizon is extended to 
three years, in which case 86% of the crises are predicted and false 
positive signals are issued 33% of the time. 
 
iv.  The housing-price gap indicator has a very poor performance given that 
it has a very high noise-to-signal ratio. Its performance improves 
substantially when the horizon considered is lengthened to 3 years.   11
 
v.  The investment gap indicator is not as noisy as the equity and housing-
price gaps, but the percentage of crises predicted is not as high as that 
predicted with the capital-flows gap or the credit gap indicators.  
 
vi.  The performance of all the indicators improves considerably as the time 
horizon is lengthened. This is true especially in the case of asset (equity) 
prices and capital flows gaps. The percentage of crises predicted 
improves in about 25% and the false positive signals drop 32%. 
 
In order to take into account that it may be the simultaneous occurrence of 
events which causes financial imbalances, we consider the following 
combinations of indicators: equity-price and credit gaps; investment and credit 
gaps; credit gap and capital flows gap; and capital flows and equity-price gaps. 
 
We report the results for the case of one year horizon of certain combinations of 
thresholds in Table No. 2. It can be observed that: 
 
i.  Only in those cases where credit is combined with equity prices or capital 
flows, the noise to signal ratio is lower than when we consider the 
indicators separately.  
 
ii.  For a credit gap of 4% and an asset price gap of 10%, the noise to signal 
ratio is almost 50% lower than when the signal is activated by the credit 
gap alone.  
 
iii.  And for a credit gap of 3% and capital flows gap of 4% the noise to signal 
ratio drops in about 70%.   
 
iv.  In addition, the noise to signal ratio of the joint indicators falls further 
when the time horizon is lengthened to 3 years as can be seen in Table 
3.  The performance of the joint indicator of credit gap and capital flows 
gap at a 3 year horizon is remarkable, with 100 per cent of crises 
predicted and 3% of false signals.  
 
These results are in line with the findings by Borio and Lowe (2002) and Borio 
and Drehmann (2009b). Indicators of vulnerability should take into account 
cumulative processes and pay particular attention to joint indicators. In our case 
the interaction of asset prices or credit with capital flows produces superior 
results that taking the indicator separately. The relevance of capital flows as 
early warning indicator in this kind of economies is a step forward in the 
analysis for emerging market economies.  
 
The same results can be used to interpret what the leading indicators would 
have said about financial vulnerabilities in the set of countries here considered 
at the time of eruption of the global financial crisis. Interestingly, despite the fact 
that these countries were not at the end seriously hit by the crisis, there is 
evidence of financial fragility at that time. The asset price gaps (by itself a noisy 
indicator) (Figure No. 5) show, for the five countries, signals of financial 
vulnerability for the period 2006-2008. However, when considered jointly with   12
the credit gap indicator (Figure No. 6-5), only for Colombia would they point in 
the direction of financial imbalances. The same can be said when credit and 




Threshold Pred. Type 2N o i s e  / Threshold Pred. Type 2N o i s e  /T h r e s h o l d P r e d . T y p e  2N o i s e  /
% error Signal % error Signal % error Signal
%% %
2 80 36 0.45 2 100 28 0.28 2 100 22 0.22
3 80 30 0.37 3 80 24 0.30 3 100 19 0.19
4 60 25 0.42 4 60 19 0.32 4 80 15 0.19
5 20 7 0.37 5 20 7 0.37 5 40 6 0.15
6 40 12 0.30 6 40 9 0.22 6 60 7 0.12
7 20 12 0.60 7 20 9 0.45 7 40 7 0.19
8 20 7 0.37 8 20 7 0.37 8 40 6 0.15
Threshold Pred. Type 2N o i s e  / Threshold Pred. Type 2N o i s e  /T h r e s h o l d P r e d . T y p e  2N o i s e  /
% error Signal % error Signal % error Signal
%% %
7 57 49 0.86 7 71 39 0.54 7 86 33 0.38
10 57 48 0.84 10 71 39 0.54 10 86 33 0.38
20 43 39 0.90 20 43 30 0.70 20 43 24 0.56
30 43 34 0.79 30 43 25 0.59 30 43 19 0.45
40 29 24 0.84 40 29 17 0.59 40 29 13 0.46
50 29 19 0.67 50 29 14 0.51 50 29 11 0.38
60 29 13 0.46 60 29 10 0.34 60 29 6 0.21
70 29 11 0.38 70 29 7 0.25 70 43 5 0.11
80 29 8 0.30 80 29 6 0.21 80 29 4 0.13
90 14 5 0.34 90 14 4 0.25 90 14 2 0.17
Threshold Pred. Type 2N o i s e  / Threshold Pred. Type 2N o i s e  /T h r e s h o l d P r e d . T y p e  2N o i s e  /
% error Signal % error Signal % error Signal
%% %
2 60 49 0.82 2 60 43 0.71 2 80 35 0.43
4 40 45 1.12 4 40 39 0.97 4 60 31 0.51
6 20 43 2.14 6 40 37 0.92 6 60 29 0.48
8 20 37 1.84 8 20 33 1.63 8 60 24 0.41











   13
Threshold Pred. Type 2N o i s e  / Threshold Pred. Type 2N o i s e  /T h r e s h o l d P r e d . T y p e  2N o i s e  /
% error Signal % error Signal % error Signal
%% %
2 40 28 0.71 2 40 21 0.52 2 60 15 0.25
3 40 19 0.49 4 40 15 0.37 4 40 10 0.26
4 40 13 0.34 6 40 10 0.26 6 40 6 0.15
5 20 6 0.30 8 20 4 0.22 8 20 1 0.07
Threshold Pred. Type 2N o i s e  / Threshold Pred. Type 2N o i s e  /T h r e s h o l d P r e d . T y p e  2N o i s e  /
% error Signal % error Signal % error Signal
%% %
2 71 28 0.39 2 100 17 0.17 2 100 17 0.17
3 57 23 0.40 3 100 13 0.13 3 100 13 0.13
4 57 16 0.27 4 71 11 0.15 4 100 11 0.11
5 29 8 0.30 5 43 6 0.14 5 57 6 0.11











Pred. Type 2 Noise/ Pred. Type 2N o i s e /
Credit gap Equity % error Signal Credit gap Capital Flows % error Signal
gap % gap %
3 10 40 9 0.22 3 2 80 15 0.19
3 20 20 4 0.22 3 3 60 10 0.17
3 30 20 3 0.15 3 4 60 7 0.12
34 0 0 1 ‐ 35 4 0 1 0 . 0 4
4 10 40 9 0.22 4 2 60 15 0.25
4 20 20 4 0.22 4 3 40 10 0.26
4 30 20 3 0.15 4 4 40 7 0.19
44 0 0 1 ‐ 45 2 0 1 0 . 0 7
5 10 40 6 0.15 5 2 60 10 0.17
5 20 20 4 0.22 5 3 40 7 0.19
5 30 20 3 0.15 5 4 40 4 0.11
54 0 0 1 ‐ 55 2 0 0 0 . 0 0
Pred. Type 2 Noise/ Pred. Type 2N o i s e /
Capital flows Equity % error Signal Credit gap Investment % error Signal
gap gap % gap %
21 0 4 0 2 2 0 . 5 6 32 2 5 2 2 0 . 8 8
22 0 2 0 1 5 0 . 7 5 33 2 5 2 0 0 . 8 0
23 0 2 0 1 3 0 . 6 7 34 2 5 1 8 0 . 7 2
24 0 0 9 ‐ 3 5 25 16 0.64
31 0 4 0 2 1 0 . 5 2 42 2 5 1 8 0 . 7 2
32 0 2 0 1 3 0 . 6 7 43 2 5 1 6 0 . 6 4
33 0 2 0 1 2 0 . 6 0 44 2 5 1 4 0 . 5 6
34 0 0 9 ‐ 4 5 25 12 0.48
41 0 4 0 1 8 0 . 4 5 52 2 5 1 4 0 . 5 6
42 0 2 0 1 2 0 . 6 0 53 2 5 1 2 0 . 4 8
43 0 2 0 1 0 0 . 5 2 54 2 5 1 0 0 . 4 0
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Horizont Pred. Type 2 Noise/ Pred. Type 2N o i s e / P r e d . T y p e  2N o i s e /
years % error Signal % error Signal % error Signal
1 80 30 0.37 60 7 0.12 40 9 0.22
2 80 24 0.30 80 4 0.06 40 7 0.19
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Figure No.6
Credit Gaps
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Figure No.7
Capital Flows Gap















































6. Final remarks 
 
This paper has ratified the conclusion derived from other works (Borio and 
Drehmann 2009a, among others) that it is possible to advance in the 
construction of simple leading indicators with which to monitor the buildup of 
risk-taking in an economy.  Along the lines of these works, the paper also 
underlines the importance of variables such as credit and asset (equity) prices 
as components of those leading indicators.  
 
However, a further step is taken here by showing that, given the particular 
characteristics of emerging economies, the flows of capital from abroad should 
play a crucial role in any attempt to construct a framework for financial stability 
in these countries.  
 
These findings give rise to at least two implications. 
   17
From the analytical point of view, the fact that capital flows can be regarded as 
an exogenous element or a trigger of boom-bust cycles in emerging economies 
does not contradict the “endogenous cycle view” behind the design of leading 
indicators. What proponents of this view stress is the cumulative and feed-back 
mechanisms that lead to risk-taking and, therefore, to the buildup of financial 
imbalances that may eventually lead to financial distress. 
 
From a policy perspective, this paper widens the scope of the macroprudential 
orientation of financial regulation and supervision when considerations of 
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Appendix A. Description of Variables and Sources
Country Description Source
Equity Prices Indices
Argentina  Merval index Banco Central de la República Argentina
Brazil Iboespa index Central Bank of Brazil
Peru Stock market index Banco Central de Reserva del Perú
Colombia Stock market index Banco de la República
Mexico Stock market index Banco de México
Housing Prices Indices
Argentina New Apartments Banco Central de la República Argentina
Brazil INCC - Total Average Central Bank of Brazil
Colombia New Housing Banco de la República
Credit as pertcentage of GDP
All Countries Credit to private sector/nomial GDP Central Banks
Capital Flows
All countries Capital and financial account, net CEPAL 1980-2005, Central Banks 2005-2008
 
 
 
 